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This article explores how piracy was defined and eventually reduced in the South China seas 
between 1842-1869.  In the early 1840s a large increase in maritime raiding led British agents to 
complain about the unwillingness of Qing officials to suppress disorder and drove the Hong Kong 
administration to propose its own solutions.  British metropolitan officials nonetheless rejected 
many of these measures, arguing that they ran counter to established international maritime laws 
that made the Qing responsible for policing Chinese waters.  Attempts were made to write this 
responsibility into the treaty which followed the Arrow War in 1860, but it was changes in the Qing 
state in the 1850s and 1860s which led Qing officials to treat small scale maritime raiding as 
seriously as that of large rebel pirate fleets.  The new Imperial Maritime Customs Service created an 
incentive to prevent smuggling and piracy which could deter trade and hence decrease customs 
revenue.  The case suggests, firstly, that the large reduction in maritime raiding rested on Sino-
British compromise and, secondly, that Britain used international maritime laws as much to control 
the expansive ambitions of Hong Kong as to encourage changes in Qing practices.  
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‘The boats here resemble the fishes of the sea...the large are always ready to prey upon the small, 
and the small upon the smaller when temptation offers...'.1 Such, according to Thomas Cochrane, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy’s China station, was the Hobbesian state of nature which 
passed for maritime order in the China seas in the 1840s. Pirates are creations of international legal 
ordering.  Samuel Coleridge once quipped that ‘no man is a pirate unless his contemporaries agree 
to call him so’.3  Because pirates operate on the high seas, which are not subject to the jurisdiction of 
a single state, defining and suppressing piracy requires at a minimum communication and an agreed 
set of protocols between states.  This article will ask how such a set of protocols came to be 
established in the China seas between 1842 and 1869 and what this can tell us about the 
development of international law more broadly in China.  This initially appears to be a case of the 
spread of legal norms from Europe through positivist international law-making as British officials 
wrote requirements for the Qing state to deal with piracy, as defined by Britain, into the treaty 
which concluded the Second Opium, or Arrow, War.  In reality, however, the agreement to suppress 
piracy was haphazardly forged and rested far more on the transformative changes in the Qing state 
in these years.  The reordering of the China seas also involved defining the role of Britain’s new 
colony, Hong Kong, making the question of piracy as much one of imperial as of international order. 
 
1842 marked a turning point in Sino-foreign relations.  The Treaty of Nanjing which concluded the 
Opium War ended the Canton system which restricted trade to one port on the China coast.4  Not 
only were four additional ports - Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen and Fuzhou - opened to foreign trade 
but the island of Hong Kong was ceded to Britain.  This created a British state interest in managing 
piracy on the China coast to protect British colonial waters.  The opening of four additional ports did 
not, however, lead to a five-fold increase in foreign trade with China but instead led to the wider 
geographic dispersal of existing trade.  This created jobs in the new ports but resulted in wide-scale 
unemployment among boatmen in Canton.  Faced with these conditions, many dispossessed sailors 
took up raids on local shipping and were quickly defined as pirates by British observers.  The 
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apparent failure of Qing officials to share this view or to act against them provoked British ire and 
led to debates about how to deal with the piracy problem in seas where sovereignty was divided 
between the Qing state and the colony of Hong Kong.  This study concludes in 1869 when a Qing-
foreign framework was enacted, which would lead to a dramatic reduction in piracy, as it facilitated 
a structured collaborative approach. 
 
Many studies of nineteenth-century British piracy suppression campaigns have emphasised the 
extent to which putting down piracy acted as cover for expanding British political influence.  British 
manoeuvres against piracy in the Persian Gulf from 1807-1820 have been seen as a political struggle 
against Wahhabi rule in Ras al-Khaimah.5  The fact that the Trucial States, now the United Arab 
Emirates, were made a British protectorate in 1820, immediately after the final skirmish against 
Qasimi ‘pirates’ suggests this was a conflict with a land-based regime.  Similarly, it has been pointed 
out that British influence in the Malay Archipelago increased dramatically after 1820 largely due to 
operations undertaken in the name of piracy suppression.6  Finally, even his contemporaries noted 
that Charles Brooke’s deployment of the Royal Navy in operations against ‘pirates’, after becoming 
governor of Labuan in Borneo in 1846, was politically motivated.  The only difference between the 
Dyak boats that Brooke launched operations against and those of the Sarawak tribes under his 
protection was their political allegiance.7  The only extant detailed study of Anglo-Qing negotiations 
to suppress piracy in the mid-nineteenth century, however, suggests that the Royal Navy did not 
want to be a global maritime police force, and in the Chinese case could not afford to be one.8  
Maritime crime was not then an excuse for British imperial aggrandisement in this case but was 
rather a problem which needed a multi-state solution to bring a legal order to the seas.  This began 
by defining ‘piracy’ and determining which jurisdiction was responsible for dealing with it. 
 
Throughout this article, the term maritime raiding will be used instead of piracy to distinguish 
between the act of private robbery at sea and the legal category ‘pirate’ which, as we will see, was 
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not so easily defined. Understanding how maritime raiding, identified as piracy, was resolved on the 
China coast has implications for our understanding of the development of international maritime 
law.9  Janice Thomson has suggested that piracy was eliminated globally once the nation state 
system expanded from Europe to the Extra-European world in the nineteenth century.  The logic of 
territorial sovereignty which came with this system led states to make a series of authority claims – 
such as eliminating non-state violence within their territories and that by their citizens outside of 
these territories. Pirates fell within this net as perpetrators of non-state violence at sea.10  Of course, 
piracy was never truly eliminated in the same way that no state has eliminated other forms of 
robbery within its territory.  After 1869, however, maritime raiding in the China seas was 
dramatically reduced and certainly no large-scale pirate fleets of the kind seen in the 1840s emerged 
before the fall of the Qing in 1911.  This process was more closely linked to the contingencies of 
changing state interests than to an emerging world system organised by the logic of territorial 
sovereignty.  The Qing state had its own priorities when dealing with piracy and these only altered 
when the state’s institutions, and crucially its tax base, changed following its tumultuous mid-
century conflicts.  It was only in the Republican period, when piracy re-emerged, that concerns 
about China’s status within the world-system of equal sovereign states motivated suppression 
efforts. 
 
   The legal reordering of the China seas did not just involve the Qing and the British metropolitan 
states.  The nascent colony of Hong Kong disrupted sovereign boundaries in Chinese waters.  Its 
government’s attempts to deal with a perceived piracy problem, predominantly under its second 
governor, John Francis Davis, provoked alarm in London.11  A colony, or indeed a mercantile 
company, which took on too much power could put a strain on the British treasury or embroil the 
empire in unwanted conflicts.  It would not be the first time.  Thus, as Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford 
have recently observed of debates about international law in the early nineteenth century, attempts 
to order China’s oceans were as much intra-imperial disputes as they were attempts to define 
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principles of inter-state relations.12  This study thus has broader implications for our understanding 
of the role of international law in China.  Recent studies have explored the processes by which 
China’s legal system was orientalised and rendered incommensurable with European traditions, 
resulting in the Qing’s exclusion from the ‘civilised’ state system to which international law applied.13  
Attempts to define piracy suggest that some international legal principles were applied in China, 
albeit in a fragmented and uneven fashion.  Indeed, with the number of actors involved in ordering 
China’s oceans, the Qing, the British, the Hong Kong administration, and the vessels of other foreign 
trading nations, they had to be.  As has been recently observed of nineteenth-century Japan, the 
legal positivist ‘standard of civilization’ which emerged in this period and which was applied to China 
co-existed with an older vision of the natural sovereign equality of all states drawn from scholars 
such as Grotius and Vattel.14  The latter led to the British government’s insistence that its naval 
vessels and those of its colony did not violate Chinese territorial waters. 
 
I will begin by explaining the contexts in which British and Qing understandings of maritime 
activity defined as piracy developed.  These distinct origins led to incommensurate ideas about what 
piracy was and how it should be dealt with in the early 1840s.  Secondly, I will explore how tensions 
between the British government and the Hong Kong administration restricted piracy suppression 
efforts.  Thirdly, the case of the Anglo-Qing collaboration against the pirate fleet of Shap Ng-tsai 
illustrates both the problems facing the British in managing oceanic order in the China seas and the 
factors which drove Qing officials to act against maritime raiders.  Finally, the article explores the 
changes which led to a shared definition of piracy as well as an agreed method of enforcement by 
1869.  The institutions which arose during the Taiping Civil War (1850-1864), most importantly the 
foreign-run Imperial Maritime Customs Service, provided a template for Sino-foreign collaboration.  
The organisation also provided structural incentives for Qing officials to adopt a conception of piracy 
closer to that held by the British.  The revenue the court received from trade through the service led 
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officials to define as piratical any private maritime raiding which might dampen trade and hence 
customs revenue. 
 
Understandings of Piracy 
 
    Qing and British agents did not collaborate to suppress piracy in the early 1840s in part because 
they did not agree on what piracy was and how it should be dealt with.  The British attitude should 
be understood in the context of evolving European conceptions of oceanic order and the role of the 
‘pirate’ within it.  European contests over the seas heightened when Spain and Portugal attempted, 
by the authority of a papal bull issued in 1493, to bisect the oceans into their own spheres of 
influence.  Unhappy with Spanish and Portuguese claims to a monopoly on trade in the East and 
West Indies, the Dutch East India Company hired the jurist Hugo Grotius to argue for its right to 
trade.17  The result, Grotius’s highly influential Mare Liberum or Freedom of the Seas, divided the 
seas into territorial waters, a narrow stretch over which the coastal state had jurisdiction, and the 
high seas.  There existed no jurisdiction in the latter except that of a nation over a ship carrying its 
flag.  This had the effect of limiting a state’s jurisdiction over seas near its coast but also 
strengthened sovereignty over ships so that they became ‘islands of territoriality’ on the high seas.18  
Alongside this oceanic ordering, piracy was being more sharply defined and prohibited.   Piracy was 
initially deployed as a tactic by British and Dutch shipping to break into the lucrative Atlantic trade, 
but by the late seventeenth century it became clear that freelance pirates were hard to control and 
often went on to raid the shipping of the states which had initially sponsored them.  Private 
maritime raiding was thus increasingly proscribed by European inter-state treaties.19  By the 
nineteenth century the pirate was regarded as ‘the enemy of all’ and Europeans had an expectation 





Conceptions of piracy in China had their own distinct trajectory resulting in Qing officials ignoring 
British requests for support in dealing with maritime raiding in the China seas.  The closest Chinese 
equivalent terms, sea-robber (洋盜 yangdao or 海盜 haidao) or sea-rebel (海匪 haifei), have been 
used to describe a wide range of phenomena in Chinese history, not all of which would be associated 
with the English term ‘pirate’.20  Chinese merchants who collaborated with Japanese raiders to 
violate the prohibitions on maritime trade (海禁 haijin) first issued by the Ming dynasty’s founder, 
the Hongwu emperor (reigned 1368-1398) were seen as sea robbers.21  Similarly, Zheng Chenggong, 
who led the final Ming resistance to the Qing conquest of China from his base on Taiwan, was 
regarded as a pirate.22  Likewise maritime raiders in the pay of the Vietnamese Tây Son dynasty who 
attacked Chinese shipping at the turn of the nineteenth century were also pirates.23  Chinese haidao 
were thus at least as much political as commercial actors. 
 
Terms related to piracy in fact broadly described two distinct phenomena. The first was small-
scale maritime raiding linked to the human geography of the China coast.  On China’s southern 
frontier, sedentary agricultural communities faded into those of maritime nomads.24  Parts of the 
littoral population were marginalised from mainland society, especially the Dan (蛋), a boat-dwelling 
community who were only granted the right to live on shore by the Yongzheng emperor in 1729.25  
This new tolerance did not stop agriculturalists dismissively referring to them as ‘water dwellers’ 
(Shuishang ren, 水上人), and circulating popular myths about their webbed feet and ability to breath 
under water.26 One contemporary gazetteer noted that piracy peaked in Guangdong and Fujian 
between April and July, when food prices were also at their highest.27  Dislocated from society and 
faced with a subsistence existence, it is unsurprising that fishermen took up arms rather than nets 
when fish were scarce.  The second category of maritime attacks identified as piracy was that of 
large-scale organised bands whose chiefs were perceived to have rebellious intent.28 Qing officials 
explicitly distinguished between the two categories, arguing with their British counterparts that only 
the latter required a serious remedy.29   
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The decentralised structure of the Qing navy also created disincentives for a coordinated Qing 
response, let alone collaboration with the British.  The governor general, provincial governor and 
provincial commander-in-chief of a jurisdiction such as Guangdong, the province adjacent to Hong 
Kong, all commanded separate naval forces.  This was a deliberate strategy to prevent too much 
military power being held by too few officials.30  In practice this structure divided responsibility for 
patrolling the seas into several overlapping territorial areas.  This led to confusion and often a failure 
to patrol some stretches of the coast at all.  As Robert Hart, the Inspector General of the Qing 
Imperials Maritime Customs Service from 1863, cynically observed of the similarly divided 
responsibility of Qing land forces during the Taiping war, this system actively encouraged officials 
not to pursue rebels beyond their jurisdictional boundaries.  If an official managed to restore order 
in his jurisdiction this reflected well on him, but if he did so when a colleague in a neighbouring 
jurisdiction could not, even if the disorderly elements had simply crossed a jurisdictional boundary 
rather than been defeated outright, it reflected even better.31  The Daoguang emperor recognised 
this, complaining throughout the 1840s that his naval forces failed to act as ‘one body’ (一体 yi ti) to 
suppress raids on shipping.32  The priorities of local officials could thus be quite distinct from those of 
the court in distant Beijing.   
Both small and large scale maritime raiding were in fact prohibited by Qing law and so the 
differing responses to them should be understood from an institutional rather than a legal 
standpoint.  Qing law regarded a pirate as someone who conducted raids in rivers or on the ocean 
and piracy was regarded as a crime in that it involved a variety of offences such as murder, kidnap 
and extortion.33  Qing officials could get away with not enforcing these regulations, despite imperial 
complaints, because piracy suppression remained only one among a number of competing priorities.  
Piracy was therefor often ignored until it was of such a degree that the emperor himself insisted that 
it should be dealt with.  Qing emperors ordered officials to suppress piracy but were also liable to 
restrict the funds available to achieve this when faced with more pressing concerns on land, as was 
the case when the Jiaqing emperor (1796-1820) was faced with the White Lotus rebellion.34  While 
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according to the letter of Qing law piracy ought to be suppressed, pragmatically it was one 
responsibility among many.  Indeed, in the 1840s Davis himself noted that the Guangdong 
authorities were too distracted by uprisings and banditry on land to turn their attention to the sea.35 
 
The Jurisdiction of Hong Kong 
 
    The second factor preventing Sino-foreign collaboration against maritime raiding was the division 
of sovereignty in Chinese waters created by the cession of Hong Kong to Britain in 1842.  This led to 
legal disputes between the colony’s officials and local Qing representatives, but also to 
disagreements between the colony and the metropolitan government.  Hong Kong’s numerous bays 
and inlets hidden by outlying islands meant that it had served as a convenient base for maritime 
raiders since at least since the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368).40  This was made worse by the spike in 
piracy driven by the post-Opium War downturn in trade at Canton.   The island’s second governor, 
John Francis Davis, complained that while poorly equipped Chinese maritime raiders did not 
threaten heavily armed British boats, they deterred small, vulnerable, Chinese vessels from visiting 
Hong Kong and thus hampered trade.41  Hong Kong’s initiatives to deal with this problem caused as 
many disputes between the island’s administration and the metropolitan government as they did 
with Qing officials. 
 
  Disagreements between British officials and the local Qing administration exacerbated the problem 
of maritime raiding.  Qing officials had assumed that the island would follow the template set by 
Portuguese Macao, whereby they would retain sovereignty over Chinese subjects in the territory.  
The British rigorously resisted such moves and the Crown’s law officers insisted that the Chinese of 
Hong Kong were British subjects.42  In practice a new legal jurisdiction less than a mile from the 
Chinese mainland provided a convenient escape route for criminals intent on avoiding punishment 
at the hands of the Qing state.   It did not help that the British had very little knowledge of their new 
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Chinese subjects.  One former maritime raider, Loo Aqui, provisioned British forces during the opium 
war and was rewarded with a large tract of land on the island.  The editor of the Friend of China later 
speculated that men such as Loo using Hong Kong as a base kept more respectable traders away.43  
A British naval captain noted that the second in command of Shap Ng-tsai’s pirate fleet, Chui Apoo, 
had also previously been living in Hong Kong and working as a barber ‘with a view to gaining good 
information and eventually cutting throats in a more congenial manner’.44   
 
      This ignorance left British administrators reliant on problematic intermediaries such as Daniel 
Caldwell, who served as Registrar General and Protector of Chinese Inhabitants in the 1850s.  
Caldwell relied on and probably colluded with a series of problematic informants.  In 1847, a group 
of Chinese convicted of raids on the ships of two British opium firms in Chinmo Bay had to be 
pardoned when it was revealed that Caldwell’s informant, Too-Apo, used the threat of malicious 
prosecutions to blackmail members of the Chinese community. 45  Similarly, in 1857 another of 
Caldwell’s informants, Wong Ma-chow, who had reported widely on the piracy of his competitors, 
was found to have been selling goods obtained in pirate raids in his Hong Kong shop.  Closer 
inspection of his books revealed that he was not only a trafficker of stolen goods but had also 
financed the raid in the first place.  After a two-year enquiry, the colonial government determined 
that Caldwell’s dubious connections rendered him unfit for public service.  Yet such was the need for 
intermediaries to work with the Chinese community that Caldwell was back working for the Hong 
Kong secret police by 1866. 
 
This led the Hong Kong administration to propose its own suppression measures as piracy 
escalated in the mid-1840s.  Davis proposed the creation of an auxiliary force of Chinese-manned 
cruisers, captained by British officers.54  The expenses of the force would be met by the merchants 
themselves with a contribution from the Hong Kong government.  This solution was appealing not 
only because of the agreement by Chinese merchants to offset some of the cost but also because 
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local knowledge was needed to help British captains identify pirates.  Commander Loring of the 
Scout, for example, was rebuked for seizing a ship packed with Chinese ‘pirates’ who turned out only 
to be travelling to visit their families for the new year festivities. 55  The colonial government 
approved the measure after particularly enthusiastic support from the Admiralty, relieved that Royal 
Navy ships would no longer be exclusively responsible for piracy suppression.56   
 
Given all of these limitations on Sino-British collaboration against maritime raiding, it is 
noteworthy that the Hong Kong colonial government, the key driver of suppression efforts, was 
often stopped in its tracks by the British metropolitan government disputing its jurisdiction.  The 
government used law to rein in a potentially wayward colony, and one in which it was difficult to see 
much profit.   On receiving a report on the colonial cruiser plan, one cabinet member commented 
that ‘this seems a dangerous power to confer on a colonial authority’.57  To their relief the plan 
collapsed when the promised Chinese investment failed to emerge.58  The government in London 
ordered the governor of Hong Kong to treat the scheme as an experiment and for it to be 
discontinued once initial funding lapsed.  Far from being concerned with piracy, officials were 
worried about providing distant colonial administrations over which they had little control with the 
means to make war without consulting London.  After the war the government was also uncertain 
about whether Hong Kong was worth any investment. In 1844 the colonial treasurer, Robert 
Montgomery Martin, declared that attempts to sustain or promote Hong Kong’s development were 
‘a waste of the treasuries and energies of England’.59  The colony’s problems were not confined to 
piracy.  The island was also an extremely unsanitary environment: a quarter of the British garrison in 
Hong Kong died of Malaria in 1843 alone and a leading British trader admitted that had his firm not 
invested so heavily in Hong Kong they would have already abandoned the island.61  It was not until 
the Taiping rebellion drove a mass emigration from the Chinese mainland that the colony’s 




A similar reluctance to invest in Hong Kong and to restrict the colony’s powers is illustrated by the 
fate of Davis’s next scheme, the Ordinance for the Suppression of Piracy of 1847.  The ordinance 
declared the presence of fire pots on board ships as evidence of piracy, banned the carrying of other 
weapons without a license and permitted the searching of foreign ships.64 The colonial office 
immediately referred the ordinance to the law officers of the crown who deemed it unlawful. The 
ruling proclaimed that the right to board foreign ships or to define what constituted piracy ‘are high 
powers which parliament has reserved to itself so far as the exercise of such power even by 
parliament is compatible with the law of nations’. 65  By 1848, British naval officers had been 
instructed that no major operations were to take place against pirates without the consent of local 
officials.66  The legal basis for this decision was that the government of Hong Kong was defined by an 
act of parliament and that nowhere in that act was it given the power to determine what constituted 
piracy.  The principle at stake for the government in London was that ‘a colonial legislature can make 
laws binding only within the limits of the colony excepting so far as parliament may have explicitly 
enlarged the range of its authority.’67  Pirates were international actors, and it was for the 
government, and then only in collaboration with other governments, to define piracy and the 
appropriate action against it. 
 
The response of Hong Kong merchants to such judgements suggests a deep-seated resentment at 
state interference in the trade of the colony.  The island’s third governor, George Bonham 
questioned the legality of another scheme, in which private foreign vessels were employed 
convoying Chinese ships to and from Hong Kong.  His antipathy towards convoying was caused by 
the work it created for him, not least when convoy ships, having been paid, themselves turned pirate 
to double the rewards for their mission.68  The merchant friendly Overland Friend of China, however, 
was apoplectic.69  An editorial declared that ‘murderers [were] allowed to desolate the shores of 
China because the British plenipotentiary had doubts about whether it was lawful for Englishmen to 
prevent them’.70  This scheme was approved by Lord Palmerston, because as a private arrangement, 
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while it created problems for Chinese officials dealing with compensation claims when agreements 
broke down, it did not raise questions about the extent of Britain’s sovereignty or that of the Hong 
Kong state.71  Attempts at legal ordering in the China seas were thus as much attempts to resolve 
conflicts between colonial boosters and the metropolitan government as they were to force that 
maritime order on the reluctant Qing.  In this climate, it was only when both Qing and British agents 
had mutual incentives that joint action against piracy could emerge.  Such was the case with the 
fleet of Shap Ng-tsai which both attacked British shipping and proved threatening to the emperor 
himself. 
 
The Sinking of Shap Ng-tsai 
 
   After the Hong Kong state’s experiments aimed at ending maritime raiding in the China seas were 
thrown out by the metropolitan government’s law officers, naval captains were instructed that no 
major operations against suspected pirates were to take place without Qing cooperation.72  Despite 
these orders, by the end of 1849 a Royal Navy captain had wiped out the entire fleet of the Chinese 
maritime raider Shap Ng-tsai with the assistance of junior Qing officials but without the consent, or 
indeed knowledge, of the central Qing government.  This case is worthy of attention for three 
reasons.  Firstly, it illustrates the types of maritime activity that Qing and British government officials 
saw as in their interest to suppress in the 1840s.  It was not until the structure of the Qing state 
changed after 1860 that a mutually agreed Sino-British definition of piracy could be reached based 
on shared interest in its suppression. Secondly, the case highlights the costs incurred to the Royal 
Navy in acting alone to deal with pirates and contributed to a revision of British anti-piracy laws.  Not 
only did the British state not want to confer on a colonial government the power to suppress pirates, 
but it was also loath to meet the costs through admiralty funds.  Finally, the case is significant 
because it was directly responsible for piracy suppression clauses being written into the Treaty of 
Tianjin which concluded the Second Opium or Arrow War (1856-60).   Attempts to make 
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international law by treaty, however, would prove futile.  Instead, the reconfiguration of the Qing 
state created a shared interest in enforcing a British conception of piracy which ultimately reduced 
maritime raiding in the China seas. 
 
The operation against Shap was not a small affair, not least because unlike petty maritime raiders, 
he attacked British shipping.  John Hay, the British naval commander responsible for the destruction 
of Shap’s fleet, chased him to Bias Bay (大亚湾 Dayawan), an inlet on the Chinese coast to the east 
of Hong Kong, in 1846.73  Hay was prevented, by his orders, from pursuing him any further.  By 1847, 
the British consul at Xiamen, further up the coast, complained that there was ‘A floating population 
of criminals and murderers, between [Xiamen] and the river Min’.74  By 1849 the local Qing circuit 
intendants at Fuzhou and Xiamen were cooperating with British naval officers to suppress this band.  
The navy had even arranged an inter-change of signals with Qing war junks to notify each other of 
the presence of pirates.75  Faced with this coordinated response, Chui Apoo, Shap’s second in 
command, moved his fleet down to Bias Bay to join the main squadron.76  It was pursued from there 
by British naval vessels as a result of accusations of Shap’s fleet’s involvement in the murder of 
British citizens and the theft of British ships in early 1849.  Between 28 September and 3 October 
Chui’s fleet of 23 ships, consisting of 1,800 men, was completely destroyed.77 While most of the 
pirates were killed or driven off, Chui himself was eventually captured in Chinese territory and was 
extradited and tried, as a resident of the colony, in the Hong Kong court.78  He was sentenced to 
transportation for life but committed suicide in prison.79  Shap’s fleet was pursued past Hainan 
Island to Haiphong on the Vietnamese coast where, between 20 and 22 October 1849, 58 vessels 
were destroyed while only six, including that of Shap, escaped.80  In the assault Hay calculated that 
about 1,700 men were killed with a further 1,450 either killed, or captured and left in the custody of 




       Qing officials collaborated with the British because of a growing sense at the imperial court that 
maritime raiding in the China seas had escalated to threatening levels.  The Daoguang emperor 
periodically commented on piracy across the 1840s, but the frequency and length of edicts on the 
topic increased dramatically in 1848.  His principal concern was that large bands of ‘sea robbers’ 
would interfere with the annual departure of the grain junks from Guangdong along the coast to 
Beijing.82  The grain transport system was vital to the capital’s food security meaning it was both 
exceptionally well defended and that attacks on it were akin to rebellion. This transport system was 
already under strain, with reserves in the capital’s granaries falling from an average of 6-10 million 
shi (石) during the Qianlong reign (1735-96) to under 3 million in the Daoguang period.83  The Grand 
Canal was built and maintained specifically with the aim of facilitating the safe transport of grain, but 
failures in the system in the mid-1820s led to grain being transported along the sea coast.84  Officials 
planning the new system pointed out that the uninhabited islands off the north and east coasts of 
Shandong might prove a haven for pirates and undermine the scheme.85  The emperors edicts in the 
late 1840s referencing Guangdong suggest that he felt the system was just as threatened by 
instability on the South China coast.  The emperor also warned his officials that ‘sea robbers’ that 
were audacious enough to threaten the grain transport junks, the embodiment of imperial authority 
at sea, relied on land-based networks which might later prove equally threatening.86 
 
      The emperor’s growing concern manifested itself in increasingly detailed instructions to his 
subordinates and in threats to those who did not follow them, giving local officials strong incentives 
to suppress large-scale piracy.  In May 1848, aware of the difficulties created by the fragmented 
Qing navy, he ordered officials in Jiangsu to inspect each other’s naval forces to ensure they existed 
in reality and not just on paper.  He also dictated precise changes to the pattern of piracy patrols so 
that specific fleets were responsible for policing both the inner and outer seas adjacent to the 
province throughout the year.87  In addition, he repeatedly chastised his officials, reminding them of 
their responsibility to keep the peace.  When informed that merchants had been coordinating to 
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fund their own anti-piracy suppression units he pointedly remarked that ‘governors and governor-
generals are personally chosen by me, they receive the state’s grace and favour.  [They] ought to 
contemplate the suppression of violence, the reassuring of the people and the pacification of the 
ocean frontier’.88  It was the job of his officials and not of merchants to organise the suppression of 
piracy. 
 
      This pressure was felt by the Qing bureaucracy in Guangdong where Shap’s fleet was operating in 
mid-1849 and explains the willingness of local Qing officials to collaborate with the British operation 
against him.  Xu Guangjin, governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, informed the emperor in 
the summer of 1848 that he was ordering his officials along the coast to continue operations against 
pirates.89  Bonham, however, complained that Xu had made no attempt to stop Shap’s fleet. 90  Even 
if Xu himself appears to have been uncooperative, the pressure placed on him by the emperor, 
which he in turn placed on his subordinates, gave them an incentive to cooperate with the British. 91 
Those who failed to suppress piracy risked being removed from their post, as was the fate of two 
officials in Dinghai prefecture, Zhejiang province.92  Pragmatic lower-level officials were used to 
adopting a repertoire of responses to crises which, even when unorthodox, were overlooked by their 
superiors if they proved effective for the task in hand.  British naval officials established cooperation 
with the local authorities in Fujian causing Shap to move his fleet to the seas near Hainan Island.   
There Hay secured the cooperation of He, the leading official on the island, who volunteered men to 
act as guides to known piratical haunts.93  Local officials collaborated with British ships when Shap’s 
fleet crossed their jurisdiction because Shap, as leader of a large band of pirates, represented a 
threat to the established order in ways that the petty piracy of the earlier 1840s had not.   
 
This form of collaboration was not seen as sustainable by officials in London or China.  While 
Commander Hay cashed in on his experiences by publishing his account of the episode, London was 
less enthusiastic.  The bounties due to sailors involved, in the form of head money, amounted to 
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£42,425, meaning the cost of the expedition far outweighed any benefit or indeed the risks 
involved.94  An expedition in which more than 3,000 pirates were killed or captured without the loss 
of one British life was clearly a one-sided affair and as such was termed a ‘military execution’ rather 
than a naval battle by the Earl of Ellenborough.95  The cost appalled London, and added fuel to the 
emerging scandal of the expensive Royal Navy support for James Brooke’s piracy operations in 
Borneo.  As a result, the 1825 legislation mandating prize bounties was repealed and replaced by 
less generous reimbursement at the admiralty’s discretion the following year.  Shap himself was 
later co-opted into Qing officialdom in order to help the bureaucracy identify and capture other 
pirates.96  The perception that the Qing response to piracy was inadequate led to Qing accountability 
for dealing with maritime raiding being added to a list of demands from British stakeholders in China 
when talks of treaty renewal began.  Creating international law through treaty would, however, 
prove to be insufficient.  It was only after the Taiping war, when piracy peaked again, that the 
problem was finally dealt with on a more permanent basis. 
 
Redefining the Pirate 
 
The problem of maritime raiding on the China coast did not end with the sinking of Shap’s fleet in 
the Gulf of Tonkin.  The outbreak of the Taiping civil war in Guangxi province two years later added 
to the disorder and poverty of the already diminished southern provinces and drove sections of the 
population to maritime crime.  By 1854, Thomas Wade, a British interpreter, reported that the 
Chinese were using foreign steamers to return to the mainland for the new year celebrations as the 
waters surrounding Hong Kong had again become impassable for Chinese ships.97  The outbreak of 
the war made it obvious to British officials that putting pressure on the Qing to step up piracy 
suppression was futile.  By March 1853, when the Taiping captured Nanjing, it was clear to them that 
the dynasty was facing the most serious threat to its survival since its foundation and that piracy 
suppression was the least of its worries.  When another war broke out between Britain and China in 
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1856, however, the resulting peace treaty mandated cooperation in the suppression of piracy.  
Ultimately, treaties could only go so far.  The final resolution of the piracy problem relied on the 
strengthening of the sovereignty of both the Qing and Hong Kong colonial states and on reaching a 
shared definition of the ‘pirate’ as a maritime actor.  The solution also had to be international in 
character, encompassing all of the states whose vessels plied the China seas. 
 
 British officials were initially reticent to push treaty change, aware that with the Taiping war still 
underway, the dynasty had more pressing concerns.  The issue was forced when Qing officials seized 
the Arrow, a Chinese lorcha, on suspicion of smuggling, while it was allegedly flying a British flag.98  
The Arrow had joined a convoy of British ships, formed in January of that year, to protect Chinese 
shipping sailing from Hong Kong to Canton from pirates.  As such it was permitted to fly British 
colours, though by the time of its seizure its registration had lapsed.99  As George Bonham had 
predicted in the 1840s, even the legal convoy system carried with it the risks of causing 
controversies in Anglo-Qing relations.  The war continued on and off for four years but the role of 
the piracy crisis in triggering it ensured that the issue was covered by the Treaty of Tianjin, agreed in 
1858, but finally ratified by the Convention of Beijing in 1860.  The treaty contained four clauses 
relating to piracy.  Clauses 18 and 19 mandated the Chinese authorities to make every effort to 
capture pirates and restore stolen property to British subjects and British merchant vessels 
respectively.  Clause 52 gave British ships of war permission to visit any Chinese port when in pursuit 
of pirates and ordered Qing officials at those ports to cooperate with them by providing repairs and 
provisions.  Finally, clause 53 stated that in view of the injury piracy caused to foreign and Chinese 
commerce, the two governments would agree to discuss measures for its suppression.100   
 
   Mandating the suppression of piracy by treaty was, however, very different from enforcing actual 
collaboration and a reform of Qing practices.  In 1864 the Commander of the Royal Navy’s China 
station was still stressing to his subordinates the need to draw ‘a proper distinction between those 
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acts of violence properly termed piracy, and those robberies on or near the coasts of China, which 
should be controlled by the Chinese police and not by her majesty’s ships’.101  The distinction was 
not one between piracy and non-piracy but an attempt to restrict the actions of British captains to 
the types of piracy they could be responsible for under international law.  By 1866, six years after 
the Treaty of Tianjin was ratified, the British minister in China, Rutherford Alcock, was still being 
urged to impress upon the Qing government the need to enforce its anti-piracy clauses.102  Yet by 
1869 a Chinese steam fleet had been constructed and the Chinese authorities in Guangdong were 
collaborating with the Hong Kong government to put down all forms of maritime raiding.  
Steamships were an effective weapon in the suppression of piracy for two reasons.  Firstly, they did 
not have to rely on wind and so could catch up with small pirate boats even when the air was still.103  
Secondly, unlike deep-draught pre-steam vessels, they could chase pirates into shallow waters 
leaving them with no refuge from pursuit.104   
    The transformation in the Qing response to piracy and the purchase of the new steamships should 
be understood in the context of changes in the structure of the imperial state in the intervening 
years.  The most significant change in the Qing state in terms of its classification of piracy came not 
from the brutal fourteen-year Taiping civil war (1850-64), the bloodiest in recorded history, but from 
the response at Shanghai to the far smaller Small Sword Uprising (1853-55).  When the rebels, a 
collection of dislocated Fujianese and Cantonese boatmen driven to rebellion by unemployment, 
captured the city, they destroyed the Qing customs house.105  This placed the foreign community in 
Shanghai in a difficult position because if merchants failed to pay import taxes they would be in 
breach of the very treaties that guaranteed their presence in China.  As a result, an agreement was 
reached to establish a foreign-run customs house with the duties collected to be held in trust until 
the Qing recaptured the city.106  The system was maintained throughout the Taiping war and was 
expanded to other ports during the negotiation of the Tianjin treaty. At this point the customs was 
also officially made a distinct department within the Qing bureaucracy while still being foreign-
run.107  The new service radically altered the Qing tax base. In 1849, the Qing administration secured 
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just 23% of its total revenue from levies on commerce and trade, in comparison to 77% of its income 
from agricultural and land taxes. By 1885, 51% of income came from duties on commerce, compared 
to 40% from traditional land taxes.108  This strengthened the link between trade and Qing revenue 
and encouraged a revision of what constituted piracy. 
 
The newly established customs service was concerned with maritime raiding because of its 
potential to enable smuggling and its dampening effect on trade, and hence customs revenue.  This 
was a view shared by foreign customs staff and by Chinese officials not linked to the service.  The 
first foreign inspector general, Horatio Nelson Lay, attempted to establish a steam flotilla for the 
customs but his plan ended in ignominy in November 1863 when the Qing government refused to 
allow him sole command of the fleet.109  Ministers in the Zongli Yamen, the office established to 
handle foreign affairs in 1861, complained that this incident had brought disgrace on them.110   
Nevertheless, officials continued to express the need to deal with piracy. As the fate of Lay’s flotilla 
was being negotiated even its critics, such as Zuo Zongquan, then overseeing military operations 
against the Taiping, insisted on the need for steam ships to patrol against pirates because of the 
harm they caused to merchant shipping.112  Robert Hart, who replaced Lay as inspector general, also 
listed an anti-piracy flotilla as one of his chief priorities for the new service.113  Between 1842 and 
the mid-1860s Qing conceptions of piracy and responses to it had shifted in line with those of 
Britain.  This was not just because a British subject headed the new customs service, but because 
independently-minded officials such as Zuo saw this as a priority.   
 
The changing response to piracy was also partly a result of the broader restructuring of the Qing 
state in the 1860s.  The establishment of the Zongli Yamen itself broadened the central 
government’s information networks.114 In the 1840s the government relied on local officials for 
information about the demands foreign representatives were making of the government.  The 
numerous complaints about piracy made to the Qing imperial commissioners Qiying and Xu Guangjin 
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by British officials do not ever appear to have been passed on to the throne.  Certainly, they do not 
appear in the collected documents on the management of foreign affairs, compiled from the 1850s 
but including documents from 1820 onwards, which were designed to act as a reference work on 
historical diplomatic difficulties.115  The Zongli Yamen, however, created a central government 
institution at which foreign diplomats, now resident in Beijing as one of the terms of the Tianjin 
treaty, could directly lodge complaints.  As a result, complaints about piracy, however small, were 
much harder to conceal from the emperor. 
 
The reduction in maritime predations on Chinese shipping did not just rest on a shared Anglo-Qing 
definition of piracy and the Qing adoption of a maritime police force.  As Rutherford Alcock, the 
British minister in China from 1866, noted, Hong Kong itself remained a ‘foul nest of piracys [sic]’ 
and he felt that dealing with this should be Britain’s priority before pressing the Qing or ‘we do not 
come clean handed into court’.116  In 1864 Admiral Kuper, then Commander of the China Station, 
had made a similar complaint.  He cited the case of the British brig Louisa, which he suggested had 
been plundered and burnt by ships which had been fitted out for piracy in Hong Kong and which had 
probably followed her out of the harbour.117  In response to such cases the governor of Hong Kong, 
Richard Macdonnell, passed a new anti-piracy ordinance in 1866 which established a high court to 
try piracy cases and made the fitting out of piratical vessels in the colony a serious offence with high-
level punishments. 118  A subsequent ordinance issued in August of the same year required all sea-
going Chinese craft to report their arrival and departure.  This not only gave the colonial state 
knowledge of the types of vessels visiting its harbours but also deterred pirate vessels from coming 
to Hong Kong to buy their arms as they had done previously.119  All of these reforms were carefully 
limited to what was in the purview of the colonial state and as such, unlike previous efforts, were 
not overturned by the crown’s law officers.  The Qing governor general at Canton, impressed by the 
effects of the registration scheme in Hong Kong, published his own regulations mandating the 




In addition to registration measures, the Hong Kong administration made efforts to bolster the 
policing of the seas within its jurisdiction.  In 1845, a water police force was established under the 
guidance of a former London Metropolitan Police captain superintendent, Charles May.121  The force 
was initially limited to two row boats, each staffed by an officer and five constables, which patrolled 
the harbour during the hours of curfew from 9pm to 6am.  This merely had the effect of encouraging 
maritime raids in the early evening, under cover of darkness but before the patrols began.122 
Eventually 24 hour patrols were introduced and in the 1870s the force’s rowboats were replaced by 
steam launches which were faster and therefor more likely to catch escaping pirates.123  At the turn 
of the twentieth century, the colony’s government supplemented these measures with an ordinance 
requiring private steam launches to carry private guards to prevent piracy by covertly armed 
passengers.124 
    
A shared Anglo-Qing conception of piracy together with the strengthening of controls by the Hong 
Kong government were not enough to suppress piracy.  British officials also sought a prohibition on 
private merchant vessels carrying weapons which would make pirate ships easier to identify as no 
non-state vessel would have a legitimate reason to be armed.  This measure, however, would 
require state patrols against pirates on the high seas to defend the now defenceless merchant ships.  
Officials in the admiralty quickly realised that even if the navy instigated such patrols they would be 
‘looked upon with certain jealousy and distrust by other maritime powers’.125  The British could not 
unilaterally insist on disarmament and searching ships without upsetting other maritime trading 
powers who might take such searches as an insult to their flag.  The ultimate solution to reducing 
piracy was thus a multi-national one, involving a number of foreign powers as well as the Qing.  In 
early 1866 the Admiralty recommended that one or more British, French, Russian and US vessels be 
employed in piracy suppression on the high seas to provide protection to now disarmed merchant 
vessels.126  The foreign office was concerned that other nations might refuse to support the initiative 
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on the grounds that British trade represented almost 90% of the total value of trade with China, but 
the proposal met with no resistance from other powers: by March the United States, France, 
Holland, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Austria Italy and Denmark had all signed up to the scheme.127   
 
The effectiveness of these measures was a result of their ability to overcome the jurisdictional 
disputes which had beset previous efforts.  The 1869 joint patrol by the An-lan and the Sui-tsing, two 
Chinese-owned and foreign-captained steam vessels, and the British gunboat HMS Bouncer 
highlights the effectiveness of this policy.  As the patrol had Chinese as well as foreign participants it 
was able not only to capture twenty pirate junks, but also to attack pirate bases on land such that 
their activity would, in the words of one Hong Kong newspaper ‘check piracy in the visited ports for 
some time’.128  In the same year a French vessel, the Algerine, although not working directly with the 
new Chinese fleet, took on a Chinese officer in its cruise after pirates.  This official was able to 
command attacks be made against pirates on land that the French captain, on his own, for fear of 
overstepping jurisdictional authority, may have been reluctant to pursue.129 
The reduction in maritime raiding was not entirely even.  Initially, until the Chinese steam fleet 
acted against it, Macau replaced Hong Kong as a venue for fitting out ships for piracy.130  Yet in 
general piracy was greatly reduced.  An 1877 British trade report remarked that Hainan island, 
thanks to the Chinese steam fleet, now enjoyed comparative freedom from piracy.131  Similarly, an 
1879 trade report from Xiamen argued that the Chinese government no longer had grounds for 
objecting to the export of iron because the coast was no longer plagued by pirates.132  The piracies 
which did take place were often opportunistic.  In 1881, the German steamer the Quinta was raided 
by pirates but only after she had been beached on a shoal and rendered defenceless.133  Of course, 
some enterprising individuals made use of the new state apparatus as a means of pursuing piracy.  In 
May 1892, a man dressed as a Chinese customs official boarded a boat on the pretence of inspecting 
it before allowing his colleagues to ransack the vessel and strip it of its possessions.134  Aside from 
such resourceful raids, however, after the 1860s contemporaries perceived piracy to be greatly 
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reduced in Hong Kong and the vicinity of the treaty ports, if not necessarily in inland waters, and it 




   Between the 1840s and the 1860s the Qing response to maritime raiding was transformed.  In the 
1840s, petty piracy was largely ignored by officials who had other concerns, particularly in 
Guangdong where an economic downturn was leading to increasing unrest on land.  The 
collaboration against Shap Ng-tsai was motivated by pressure from the emperor, causing local 
officials to temporarily reassess their priorities.  Qing responses to maritime raiding changed, and 
came to mirror those of Britain, only after the Taiping Civil War profoundly reshaped the empire’s 
bureaucracy.  While British pressure played a role in driving this change, the Qing state’s power to 
control events in the China sea was stronger by 1869 in the sense that the central court could use its 
institutions to enforce its will.  Similarly, the Hong Kong colonial state was weaker than it might have 
been had the British metropolitan government not restricted its ambitious piracy suppression 
initiatives.  The period was thus one which saw the remapping of de facto and de jure power at sea. 
 
   The reduction in maritime raiding in the China seas suggests a revision of our understanding of the 
role of international law in China.  Alongside the ‘standard of civilization’ which gradually excluded 
China from the norms of international law there remained a naturalist vision of certain sovereign 
rights pertaining to all states, including the right to inviolable territorial waters.  British observers 
upheld these principles in China either because they believed them to apply or because it suited 
specific agendas.  In the case of piracy, the British government’s insistence on Chinese rights in 
Chinese seas reduced their own expenses and commitments, as well as the potential for trouble 
being stirred up by a more powerful Hong Kong.  This highlights two features of international law.  
Firstly, not all of the actors applying it automatically assumed that China was exempt from its 
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principles despite the degree to which Chinese laws had been orientalised by the post-opium war 
period.  Secondly, international law was not seen to be complete, admitting of either exclusion or 
inclusion.  This feature gave those involved in legal arguments at least the opportunity of both 
excluding a state from legal principles accepted elsewhere and including them when it suited them 
to do so, rendering international law a more effective tool of empire.  In the late nineteenth-century 
the jurist John Westlake set this principle out explicitly arguing that ‘our international society 
exercises the right of admitting outside states to part of its international law without necessarily 
admitting them to the whole of it’.135   
    
The changing responses to maritime raiding in the China seas also suggest a reworking of our 
understanding of the reduction in maritime depredation globally.  The reduction in private violence 
at sea was not a product of the spread of a western conception of sovereignty which left no space 
for the pirate.  Scholars have recently suggested that Britain’s role in the process of ordering the 
oceans in the nineteenth century was marked by a lack of broad based principles and instead 
centred on regional compromises.136  This was the case in China because of the need to order the 
waters surrounding Hong Kong without incurring the cost of patrolling the entire China coast or 
allowing the colony to over-extend its powers.  The Qing government and its agents did not adopt 
wholesale a European conception of sovereignty which was antithetical to maritime raiding.  
Instead, by the late 1860s the British and other maritime powers found the Qing ready to eliminate 
maritime raiders for the instrumental reason that they harmed trade and thus the central 
government’s newly revitalised customs revenue.   
 
After 1869, maritime raiding on the China coast remained subdued, compared with the 1840s and 
1850s, until the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911.  The 1920s saw a rise in the number of pirate 
attacks, including a number of assaults on British shipping.137  After Chiang Kaishek’s nationalist 
regime took control of Nanjing in 1927 it saw the ability to police its own waters as a cornerstone of 
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its campaign to win full sovereignty for the new China by ending foreign extraterritorial privileges in 
the country.138  In the late-Qing piracy was dealt with when it threatened state interests, such as 
grain transport ships and tax revenues.  By the late 1920s however, piracy suppression was taken 
seriously because it represented a threat to a new kind of sovereignty which China’s leaders 
regarded as important: that of a nation state over its territory, including foreign citizens residing 
within it, and over the waters along its coastline.  While these efforts were not always successful, as 
continuing British alarm over piracy cases in the 1930s suggests, they were motivated by a desire for 
sovereign equality within the nation state system.139 This desire did not drive the piracy suppression 
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